Cutting Through the Crap #2

It’s quite popular (mostly on the Right, but not exclusively) to say that the government should be run more like a business.  Usually this just means something like “deficits are bad.”  But I think the concept should be taken more seriously–and literally.  Meanwhile, the budget negotiations currently on the brink of total failure look absolutely nothing like a business–all this talk of where spending can be cut or how revenues can be raised, in fact, seems ridiculously premature.

How Not to Start a Business 101

If I started a company, set my prices, then decided what to manufacture, then determined my costs, then sold my widgets for what turned out to be a loss, I’d look pretty stupid.  If I then decided that the way to fix the situation was to keep prices the same and make an inferior product to cut costs, I’d look even worse.  Ditto if I raised my prices but still didn’t manage to match my costs.  But that’s pretty much what our leaders are talking about doing right now, because taxes are the prices the government charges for the services it provides.

That’s why all this talk of cutting spending or raising taxes makes no sense until we first have the “adult conversation” we were promised.  That conversation needs to be about what services the government should and should not provide. That, in our deeply divided country, is the central bone of contention.  To assume the answer going into budget talks is simply to prolong an already far too old problem.

Running the country like a business would entail doing the following:

  1. Decide what services we want the federal government to provide.
  2. Determine how much it will cost to provide those services.
  3. Determine the best way to raise an amount of revenue equal to those costs.

It’s true, of course, that the budget is not a tabula rasa, as this formula pretends.  But it’s also true that this country desperately needs to have a deliberate conversation about the purpose of government that assumes this sort of tabula rasa as a convenient fiction.  In the absence of such a conversation, any deals that are worked out regarding long-term budgetary policies are unlikely to do anything other than make our problems much, much worse.

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Great Places

Last week, I wrote about the fact that progressives desperately need to come up with a twenty-first-century American Dream–and the fact that twenty-first-century America can almost be defined as the kind of place where you can’t come up with a new, believable American Dream.  A problem.

Enter David Roberts and Tom Philpott, who have been writing a series of articles in Grist about the direction (those spatial metaphors really are hard to avoid!) that progressive movements need to take, under the banner/slogan “Great Places.”  Roberts’s series of five articles on the idea of great places is here: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  Philpott’s meditations on where food fits into the picture are here: 1, 2.  Essentially, Roberts’s argument is that progressives should be concentrating on transforming (primarily) cities into fun, exciting, joyous places to live and work.  Urban areas should become more palpably collaborative places where creative and skilled individuals come together to produce great things that they could not produce apart; they should use the power of density to make modern life sustainable; and they should be centers of wondrous design to delight the minds and bodies of their inhabitants.  Philpott chimes in by talking first about the horrors of the modern industrial food complex and then about the potential for regional and local food producers to use the power of place to rejuvenate and transform our foodsheds.

I think some variation on this theme is arguably The Answer to the problem I discussed last week.  First, I’ll explain why the great places idea, once tweaked, is potentially revolutionary.  Then, I’ll explain why it needs some tweaking to get us where we want to go.

So, to begin with, a brief return to the well of post-structuralism, which in many ways embraces a politics of plurality.  If it is impossible to envision or believe in a single Promised Land for The American People–if it is impossible even to believe in a single, unified American people in the face of the nation’s palpable fragmentation and polarization–it is quite easy and even necessary to see multiple, more modest promised lands proliferating the spaces we already inhabit.  Improving your home community, town, or city is a manageable, concrete goal that is obviously in your interests and (hopefully) within your ability to imagine.  But it is also a goal that, sooner or later, requires action on a scale beyond the local–possibly far beyond the local if it incorporates renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and other such ambitious endeavors.  It is, in short, a way literally to situate political practice.  More on that in a moment.

The other immediate advantage of the Great Places idea is that it can address and eventually ameliorate our social fragmentation without engaging in the fool’s errand of confronting it head-on by attempting to impose a common American identity on the most diverse population on the planet.  When a bunch of people in disparate regions work simultaneously to create and improve an equally disparate bunch of great places, certain common values underpinning their success will likely emerge.  (I don’t want to gloss over the difficulty of this step; competing interests and bitter fights between equally well meaning antagonists will be unavoidable along the way, and those fights will obscure or destroy some opportunities to find and embrace common values.  However, I believe that some genuine broadly shared values will emerge, and such values are sorely needed right now.)

Our society is becoming increasingly defined by its conflicts–even more so now than in the past.  It is too fragmented to sustain a common dream, so starting from the dream is almost putting the cart before the horse.  But where a forced and ill-fitting global metanarrative of unity will not serve us, myriad local actions may.  Community organizers, activists, and civic leaders working throughout the country to better their own local spheres may ultimately find enough common cause to build meaningful coalitions.

The old mantra “Think Globally, Act Locally” meant in part “think about the global context and consequences of your actions and, having done so, take local action accordingly.”  As the world system has become larger and more complex, thinking globally has become alternately impossible (the system is too complicated to be thought) and enervating (to the extent that it can be thought, global context dwarfs local action until it seems without sufficient power to be of consequence).  A progressive politics rooted in great places could rejuvenate this mantra, replacing it with something like “Act Locally to Think Globally.”  By which I mean that the very process of acting locally with purpose and self-awareness can become synonymous with thinking globally, if, in the process of creating a great place, we take seriously the relationship of that place to the other places around it–its region; its nation; its local, national, and international resources; its sources of food, water, energy, labor, and capital.

Progressives cannot build great places by plundering resources from others.  Instead, they must negotiate and compete with their neighbors in good faith.  To do so, activists in each locale must develop a deep understanding of the particular needs of that locale and the best ways to meet those needs without trampling those of others.  Los Angeles needs water, but it can’t simply usurp a greater share of the Colorado River.  Working-class people living in the city’s food deserts need access to cheap, fresh food–but not at the expense of the living standards and dignity of the agricultural laborers throughout California who produce it.  So, making Los Angeles a better place requires its denizens to deal justly with their neighbors in very concrete ways.  Through such practical, sustained, and serious engagement with the specificities of place, we can gain a far greater understanding of our homes.  We may thus find ourselves mapping our global reality through action in a way that we never could through thought alone.

Roberts’s emphasis on delight as a characteristic of great places is also crucial.  Pleasure is a primary driving force in many walks of life, and it can be a driving force behind political practice as well.  A great place is also a great space.  Great spaces are palpably joyous to occupy.  They may be open and tranquil or frenetic and exciting, but in any case, when you enter one, you smile.  You are enveloped.  You fit.  The pleasure of being in welcoming or exciting spaces is a powerful impetus to defend those spaces, and the promise of delight is a powerful motivator to construct new ones.

The vast majority of homebuyers list livability and walkability as high priorities in choosing new homes.  There are not currently enough livable and walkable neighborhoods to satisfy this demand.  Not by a long shot.  Creating more would significantly increase the happiness of a great many people, who in turn would more readily embrace the political and community values that made success possible.

Where Roberts goes wrong, though, is his privileging of urban space.  This is a frankly mercenary choice, as he makes clear in his first article.  Locations with higher population densities vote Democratic and locations with lower population densities vote Republican, with striking consistency across all fifty states.  Thus, Roberts believes, cities can provide the basis for an identity politics to drive progressive victories.  Perhaps, he even seems to suggest, if we can lure more people into cities, the increasing urbanization of the nation will lead to its increasing liberalization.  In addition, he believes that density is so important to solving the environmental problems we face that encouraging anyone to live in rural or even suburban areas is counterproductive.

Philpott’s focus on food and foodsheds provides a necessary corrective to Roberts in this regard.  Even if it were theoretically true from a narrow political perspective that progressives could succeed by abandoning rural America and sparking a new wave of urbanization, that perspective would soon be brought up short by a simple fact: We gotta eat.  And we want to eat real food.  The kind produced on farms and pastures, not in factories or feedlots.  The kind produced with fewer efficiencies of scale, requiring more labor by more farmers.  If the real food movement is to succeed on a scale large enough to provide healthy, responsibly raised food to a significant percentage of Americans, rural places have to be just as great as urban places.  People need to be motivated to live where they can grow real food.  And, again, progressives in cities cannot benefit from the labor of farmers at the expense of those farmers’ quality of life.

Plus, it is not in fact true that progressives can succeed by moving as many people as possible into cities and screwing everyone else.  Not while the U.S. Senate exists.  And not while we care about social and economic justice, which is in as short supply in rural communities as in inner cities.  It’s also terribly short-sighted and strategically daft to put forward any definition of “Great Places” that does not encompass state and national parks.  If we want to argue broadly that government can help us make places great, there is almost nowhere where that’s more palpably true (and no spaces that are already more beloved) than those parks.

With that caveat, though, Roberts is clearly onto something huge.  The immediate questions to ask in response are clear: Do you live in a great place?  If so, how can your community make it better or protect it from harm?  If not, how can you make it great?  Answer those questions in detail, and we’re on our way to building the progressive agenda for the twenty-first century.

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The American Dream?

For the last six months, I’ve been obsessing on and off about a question that I first heard posed by Robert Cruickshank and Jenifer Fernandez Ancona: What would a twenty-first-century, progressive version of the American Dream look like?  The twentieth-century American Dream–of work inevitably rewarded and prosperity for all who deserve it–seems more like a fairy tale now, in an age when almost no one feels financially stable and when many Americans have come to see the simple act of retirement as an impossible fantasy.  The need to replace and rejuvenate the American Dream was the subject of a session Cruickshank and Ancona held at a regional RootsCamp in San Francisco last November.  Since then, I’ve been seeing the vacuum created by the lack of an answer to their question everywhere I look.

The most obvious place it appears is in the repeated spatial metaphors used by the President and by Democrats generally to describe their agenda.  We need to go forward, not backward.  In D, not R.  In the right direction, not off on the wrong track.  But the ship of state turns slowly.  President Obama has said that, while he may sometimes zig to one side and zag to the other, he sets his course by the North Star in his quest to reach the land beyond the horizon.

This type of abstract language is almost impossible to avoid, of course.  It has, moreover, an important function: it is meant to inspire hope for a future that simply cannot be exhaustively envisioned at present.  And in the hands of an orator as skilled as the President, it can be extremely compelling.  But it is so abstract that it can sometimes seem to cede any attempt to imagine the concrete, visceral reality of the future at all.  The present struggle is real, sometimes all too real, but the future remains a bit misty.  This contrast leads to a vague utopianism that seems to me to be at the heart of the often-remarked “messaging” problem that the Democrats have been struggling with since 2009: The American people simply don’t have a fully realized understanding of where their elected leaders want to lead them, or what that Promised Land will look like once we get there.

Conservatives have a far easier time communicating their goals in terms of place.  After all, although the land they want to take us back to is one that never existed, it is nonetheless well defined in the cultural imaginary.  When I’m in a snarky mood (which is often), I describe it as Petaluma, California (the filming location of both American Graffiti and Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign commercials).  It’s a world in which the old American Dream still makes sense, in which everyone who works hard and lives decently prospers.  And everyone is white.

I should emphasize that I don’t mean to single out elected officials or the Democratic Party for criticism here.  The void where a contemporary version of the American Dream should be has been a general problem for pretty much all current progressive movements (I’m going to insist on that plural).  I’ve been struck by the fact that most progressive organizations and leaders–although they use narratives constantly to drive individual campaigns–lack a broad, overarching, contextualizing metanarrative that is sufficiently ambitious, coherent, compact, and compelling to drive an entire movement or set of movements.  A new American Dream would satisfy that need quite handily.

One example of the problem among many: At the national RootsCamp that took place in D.C. last December, a group working for Net Neutrality complained of the difficulty of organizing around such a complex issue.  The battles surrounding Net Neutrality–even a workable definition of the term–are too complicated to convey to potential activists or supporters in a simple e-mail or sound bite.  By the time you finish explaining what the issues are, what the policy options are, what the current proposals are, what the stakes are…you’ve lost most of your audience, and the rest still doesn’t know exactly what side it’s on.

Offhand, I can’t think of any important issue that isn’t that complex.  And responsible organizers do not seek to obscure such complexity.  But complications would become more manageable if there were a comprehensible roadmap toward our larger destination underlying each of the various marches to the various way stations on the journey.  A larger narrative can clarify the ultimate import of labyrinthine laws and regulations (if not the laws themselves).  Without it, effective grassroots organizing around the complexities of public policy is almost impossible, not least because it becomes so bloody difficult to discern the hair’s-breadth difference between victory and defeat.

[Here’s the obligatory Theory-laden paragraph, for those interested in such things:]  As a good post-structuralist, I am of course aware that metanarratives are no longer all they’re cracked up to be and haven’t been for a long time now.  (Jean-François Lyotard famously defined postmodern society way back in 1979 as being characterized by an “incredulity towards metanarratives,” a description that if anything applies more than ever.)  Certainly, it would take a constantly renewed act of will to believe in anything as grand as a new version of the American Dream, or even to articulate one with a straight face.  Postmodern society is too fragmented and plural to be neatly sewn together with an overarching story.  The world of global late capitalism is too complex to wrap one’s mind around, which (as Fredric Jameson argued) is why old-style metanarratives tend to be replaced in contemporary society by stories of conspiracy, stories whose purpose is precisely to suggest the contours of a shadowy and nebulous world system that’s too big to grasp.  In short, it is simply beyond the imaginations of most of us to come up with a story that both provides us with a useable map of the entirety of the world we inhabit and places us believably within that world as protagonists–as agents capable of meaningful action–which is the purpose in this context of any metanarrative.

So, that’s the problem I (and others) have been thinking about lately.  How do we build some version of the American Dream that can make sense of, support, and even drive progressive movements in the twenty-first century, in the face of a world too complex for metanarratives and a populace all but incapable of believing in them?  Tune in next week for…The Solution!

 

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On Track Records

This story in TPM may serve to remind us that the Right has made a series of predictions about the effects of policy on the economy over the past several years.  The first was that the Bush tax cuts would increase, rather than decrease,  revenue: They would stimulate so much new economic activity that the government would realize a net gain on taxes collected, even though the percent of each dollar taxed would decrease.  It’s quite clear that the first of the two Bush tax cuts utterly failed to produce growth.  Revenue fell fairly dramatically after it was enacted.  Revenue grew after the second one, but that was arguably the result of the housing bubble (which tooketh away quite soon after it gaveth).  For Paul Krugman’s commentary and charts on this issue, see here and here.

At any rate, the claim of those passing the cuts was that there was no chance they would turn surpluses into deficits, because they would pay for themselves.  This was dramatically not the case.  The next major claim to remember is the one of almost all conservative legislators and pundits about the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, aka the Obama stimulus package.  Here, using reality to test predictions yields even starker results.  Left-leaning economists (Krugman, Robert Reich, Joseph Stieglitz, etc.) tended to use math to evaluate the ARRA.  They said that, given an expected shortfall in aggregate demand of $2 to $2.5 trillion, it would take stimulus spending of $1.2 to $1.4 trillion to plug the hole and spur a robust recovery.  They predicted that the $800 billion act actually passed by Congress would prevent all-out depression, but would lead to a stagnant recovery.  Almost exactly like the one we’ve seen.  Meanwhile, the voices on the Right used one word over and over again: “hyperinflation.”  That’s right.  The kind of inflation where you walk into a grocery store, and prices are rising so fast that they actually change while you’re shopping, thanks to computers attached to cash registers.  Someone cuts in front of you in line, and by the time you get to the cashier, that gallon of milk is 3 dollars more than it would have been if they hadn’t.  That kind of inflation.

So, conservative pundits are not looking too bright by the objective criteria of “did their predictions come true, yes or no?”  That’s why the TPM story is noteworthy.  Paul Ryan is totally, completely sure that the United States could go for as much as three or four days defaulting on our debt obligations without any kind of lasting downside.  He sees all the armageddon talk about default as about as believable as predictions of the Rapture coming today (May 21).  Given the GOP’s track record of predicting the economy’s response to governmental action, I would hope that no one takes his opinion to be one of an expert.  Or even of a barely competent observer.

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Cutting Through the Crap #1

So, I’m listening to all the coverage of the Senate hearings on eliminating oil subsidies today.  The rhetoric–not just of the principals, but of the actual news commentators on NPR–is insane.  The top five oil companies want to know why they are being singled out and punished by being made to pay the same taxes that everyone else does.  The entitlement they express is shocking.  If you are going to be treated like everyone else, that’s punishment.  Paying normal taxes, rather than being given $2 billion in subsidies, is being singled out.

Just to clarify a couple things: No one (who is intellectually honest) is suggesting that these companies would have to pay taxes if the Senate bill became law.  They would simply be required to hire a lot more tax lawyers than they currently do and pay them more.  But the end result would be the same as it is now.  General Electric paid no income tax on its $5.1 billion in U.S. profits in 2010.  Instead, it received a $3.2 billion benefit. Bank of America received a $1.9 billion refund on profits of $4.4 billion.  Oil companies that lose their subsidies will simply find another portion of the tax code to exploit.  If one doesn’t exist, they will write one.  They can do that.

Which is really the main point that is getting lost amid these hearings and the ridiculous news coverage they engender: We can argue over whether oil companies need subsidies to help them develop risky and costly new fields, but that’s not the reason they get money from the IRS rather than giving it to the IRS.  The simple facts are these: the government, through its tax code, takes your money away from you and gives it to major corporations.  Why?  Because those corporations are more powerful than you are, and they want your money.  Period.  Any other explanation is window dressing.

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Hello world!

This is blog 3.0, for those keeping track.  Switching from Sandvox to WordPress, thereby clawing my way into blog semi-sophistication.  And, hopefully, regular posting.

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